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Ralph
Nader, Part II
Brian
Trumbore
President/Editor, StocksandNews.com
There are a couple of reasons why I'm
running a second piece on Ralph Nader in three weeks.
First, the following article from 1959 was a preview
of Nader's 1965 groundbreaking book, "Unsafe at Any
Speed." Second, this is part of our nation's corporate
history. Third, I'm traveling and very grateful to
The Nation magazine for allowing me to reprint
it, thus saving your editor quite a bit of time. This
is in no way an endorsement of Ralph Nader's candidacy
for president. It merely acknowledges, however, his
role as consumer advocate and the important work he
did decades ago to help make our lives a little safer.
At the same time I, like many of you, have problems
with his style. You're either with him, he believes,
or a corrupt tool.
---
April
11, 1959
"The
Safe Car You Can't Buy"
The
Cornell Aeronautical laboratory has developed an exhibition
automobile embodying over sixty new safety concepts
which would enable an occupant to withstand a head-on
collision at 50 mph with at most only minor scratches.
In its design, six basic principles of crash protections
were followed.
1.
The car body was strengthened to prevent most external
blows from distorting it against the passengers.
2.
Doors were secured so that crash impacts could not
open them, thereby saving passengers from ejection
and maintaining the structural strength of the side
of the car body.
3.
Occupants were secured to prevent them from striking
objects inside the car.
4.
Interior knobs, projections, sharp edges and hard
surfaces have been removed and the ceiling shaped
to produce only glancing blows to the head (the most
vulnerable part of the body during a crash).
5.
The driver's environment was improved to reduce accident
risk by increasing visibility, simplifying controls
and instruments, and lowering the carbon monoxide
of his breathing atmosphere.
6.
For pedestrian safety, dangerous objects like hood
ornaments were removed from the exterior.
This
experimental car, developed with funds representing
only a tiny fraction of the annual advertising budget
of, say, Buick, is packed with applications of simple
yet effective safety factors. In the wrap-around bumper
system, for instance, plastic foam material between
the front and rear bumpers and the back-up plates
absorbs some of the shock energy; the bumpers are
smoothly shaped to convert an increased proportion
of blows from direct to glancing ones; the side bumpers
are firmly attached to the frame, which has been extended
and reinforced to provide support. Another feature
is the installment of two roll- over bars into the
top of the car body as added support.
It
is clear that Detroit today is designing automobiles
for style, cost, performance and calculated obsolescence,
but not - despite the 5,000,000 reported accidents,
nearly 40,000 fatalities, 110,000 permanent disabilities
and 1,500,000 injuries yearly - for safety.
Almost
no feature of the interior design of our current cars
provides safeguards against injury in the event of
collision. Doors that fly open on impact, inadequately
secured seats, the sharp-edged rear-view mirror, pointed
knobs on instrument panels and doors, flying glass,
the overhead structure - all illustrate the lethal
potential of poor design. A sudden deceleration turns
a collapsed steering wheel or a sharp-edged dashboard
into a bone- and chest-crushing agent. Penetration
of the shatterproof windshield can chisel one's head
into fractions. A flying seat cushion can cause a
fatal injury. The apparently harmless glove-compartment
door has been known to unlatch under impact and guillotine
a child. Roof-supporting structure has deteriorated
to a point where it provides scarcely more protection
to the occupants, in common roll-over accidents, than
an open convertible. This is especially true of the
so-called "hardtops." Nor is the automobile designed
as an efficient force moderator. For example, the
bumper does not contribute significantly to reduction
of the crash deceleration forces that are transmitted
to the motorist; its function has been more to reflect
style than absorb shock.
These
weaknesses of modern automobile construction have
been established by the investigation of several groups,
including the Automotive Crash Injury Research of
the Cornell University Medical College, the Institute
of Transportation and Traffic Engineering of the University
of California and the Motor Vehicle Research of Lee,
New Hampshire.
The
remarkable advances in crash-protection knowledge
achieved by these research organizations at a cost
of some $6 million stands in marked contrast to the
glacier-like movements of car manufacturers, who spend
that much to enrich the sound of a door slam. This
is not due to any dearth of skill - the industry possesses
many able, frustrated safety engineers whose suggestions
over the years invariably have taken a back seat to
those of the stylist. In 1938, an expert had this
to say in 'Safety Engineering:'
The
motor industry must face the fact that accidents occur.
It is their duty, therefore, to so design the interiors
of automobiles that when the passenger is tossed around,
he will get an even break and not suffer a preventable
injury in accidents that are today taking a heavy
toll.
In
1954, nearly 600,000 fatalities later, a U.C.L.A.
engineer could conclude that "There has been no significant
automotive- engineering contribution to the safety
of motorists since about the beginning of World War
II?" In its 1955 annual report, the Cornell crash-research
group came to a similar conclusion, adding that "the
newer model automobiles (1950-54) are increasing the
rate of fatalities in injury-producing accidents."
In
1956, Ford introduced the double-grip safety-door
latch, the "dished" steering wheel, and instrument
panel-padding; the rest of the industry followed with
something less than enthusiasm. Even in these changes,
style remained the dominant consideration, and their
effectiveness is in doubt. Tests have failed to establish,
for example, an advantage for the "deep-dish" steering
wheel compared with the conventional wheel; the motorist
will still collapse the rim to the hub.
This
year, these small concessions to safety design have
virtually been discontinued. "A square foot of chrome
sells ten times more cars than the best safety-door
latch," declared one industry representative?
Prevailing
analyses of vehicular accidents circulated for popular
consumption tend to impede constructive thinking by
adherence to some monistic theory of causation. Take
one of the more publicized ogres - speed. Cornell's
findings, based on data covering 3,203 cars in injury-producing
accidents, indicate that 74 percent of the cars were
going at a traveling speed under 60 mph and about
88 percent involved impact speeds under 60 mph. The
average impact speed on urban roads was 27 mph; on
rural roads, 41 mph. Dangerous or fatal injuries observed
in accidents when the traveling speed was less than
60 mph are influenced far more by the shape and structure
of interior car components with which the body came
into contact than by the speed at which the cars were
moving?
In
brief, automobiles are so designed as to be dangerous
at any speed.
Our
preoccupation has been almost entirely with the cause
of accidents seen primarily in terms of the driver
and not with the instruments that produce the injuries.
Erratic driving will always be characteristic, to
some degree, of the traffic scene; exhortation and
stricter law enforcement have at best a limited effect.
Much more significant for saving life is the application
of engineering remedies to minimize the lethal effects
of human error by designing the automobile so as to
afford maximum protection to occupants in the event
of a collision. In a word, the job, in part, is to
make accidents safe.
The
task of publicizing the relation between automotive
design and highway casualties is fraught with difficulties.
The press, radio and television are not likely to
undertake this task in terms of industry responsibility
when millions in advertising dollars are being poured
into their coffers. Private researchers are reluctant
to stray from their scholarly and experimental pursuits,
especially when cordial relations with the industry
are necessary for the continuation of their projects
with the maximum of success. Car manufacturers have
thought it best to cooperate with some of these programs
and, in one case, when findings became embarrassing,
have given financial support. The industry's policy
is bearing fruit; most investigators discreetly keep
their private disgust with the industry's immobility
from seeping into the limelight?
By
all relevant criteria, a problem so national in scope
and technical in nature can best be handled by the
legislative process, on the federal level, with delegation
to an appropriate administrative body. It requires
uniformity in treatment and central administration,
for as an interstate matter, the job cannot be left
to the states with their dissimilar laws setting low
requirements that are not strictly enforced and that
do not strike at the heart of the malady - the blueprint
on the Detroit drawing board. The thirty-three-year
record of the attempt to introduce state uniformity
in establishing the most basic equipment standards
for automobiles has been disappointing.
Perhaps
the best summation of the whole issue lies in a physician's
comment on the car manufacturer's design policy: "Translated
into medicine," he writes, "it would be comparable
to withholding known methods of life-saving value."
---
Congress
passed the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 overwhelmingly. Federal rules regarding seat
belts, air bags, manufacturers' recalls, crash tests,
and other safety factors can be traced to that act.
*Reprinted
with permission from the April 11, 1959 issue of The
Nation magazine. For subscription information,
call 1-800-333- 8536. Portions of each week's Nation
magazine can be accessed at http://www.thenation.com.
Thanks
to H.A. for helping me out with this.
Brian
Trumbore
BUYandHOLD
does not recommend any securities. The securities
mentioned above are being used for informational and
illustrative purposes only and should not be regarded
as an offer to sell or as a solicitation of an offer
to buy.
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