Intro B&H101 Under the Oak The Mom Chronicles Wall Street History Week in Review Glossary Financial Planning Understand Taxes   "BUYandHOLD" Tax FAQ   The 13 Steps to Investing Foolishly   Carlson on Taxes Archives Oil and the 70's - Part II Brian Trumbore President/Editor, StocksandNews.com While the topic is still fresh, I thought I'd follow-up last week's column with some more material I first wrote back in October 1999 in this space concerning the oil price shocks of the 1970s. I added a few new statistics from the era. In March 1974 the Arab oil embargo was lifted, but the event had left its mark. American prosperity had depended in large part on what the Shah of Iran described as "the mystical power of the oil companies," or, the arrogance with which the industrial world, in the role of colonial power, claimed dominion over the planet's natural resources. The price of oil continued to rise throughout the 70s, from $2 a barrel in 1970 to a peak of $40 by 1980. Oil wasn't the only commodity to witness huge price increases, either, as tin, silver and gold rose to all-time levels, while rubber, cotton and grain hit new highs, too. In 1974, the consumer price index in the U.S. rose at an 11% clip, the highest peacetime price-surge in American history. A year later, President Gerald Ford unveiled his "Whip Inflation Now" program, with its humiliating WIN buttons. Meanwhile, worldwide, between 1973 and 1981, inflation in all of the developed nations was 9.7%, with GDP growth of just 2.4% on an annualized basis. [In the U.S., inflation was below 8% for this same period, with annual GDP growth of 2.3%.] Of course the situation was far rosier for the Arab oil nations. From 1973 through 1978, annual revenues from crude in the producing countries grew enormously. For example: Saudi Arabia's rose from $4.35 billion to $36 billion, Kuwait's from $1.7 billion to $9.2 billion, and Iraq's increased from $1.8 billion to $23.6 billion. But this huge swing in wealth led to a corresponding dependence on the very industrialized nations the Arab countries had sought to teach a lesson. The producers had to sell their oil, and the industrial countries were their main consumers. So, with the meager growth in the developed economies, along with a wicked recession, the laws of supply and demand caught up with the sheiks. Energy conservation programs and increased oil production by nations not affiliated with OPEC eventually led to a glut. The bargaining position of OPEC grew weaker and its goal of a high, uniform price level was difficult to maintain. Also, the huge surpluses that the cartel generated had to be invested somewhere, and, for the most part, they went into the industrialized bloc. The oil states also had to look to these same countries for the technical expertise necessary to develop their own economies and, further, they sought help in modernizing their armed forces. [The issue is similar to today. The large investors of the Middle East have been plowing their money into the West over the past ten years, so Saudi Arabia et al need to be careful not to "break" the world economy, or their own investments will plummet along with the rest. Of course, many of their equity holdings have already tumbled significantly in the last two years.] For its part, by the late 1970s the U.S. was prepared to threaten force if its oil supplies were interrupted again. We were not just worried about revolutions in the producing countries, but also the extension of Soviet influence in the region, i.e., the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. After the 1973 oil embargo, Nixon and Kissinger had looked on Iran as an important regional ally. Unlike King Faisal in Saudi Arabia, the Shah of Iran did not use his oil to place political pressure on the U.S., although he had no problem hiking the price. Iran allowed the U.S. to refuel ships at its ports, while the war of words between America and the Soviet Union heated up. Nevertheless, a second oil crisis in the 1970s accelerated by '79 as a result of the Iranian revolution, as well as the reaction in the bulk of the Arab world to the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. Oil was soon at $40 a barrel. But, again, the forces of supply and demand took over, and the industrialized nations began to develop energy conservation programs, while OPEC failed to maintain a united front on prices and production levels. The 1980s would then see crude tumble. Sources: "The Great Wave" David Hackett Fischer "A History of the Arab Peoples" Albert Hourani "A Reassessment of U.S. Strategic Interests in the Post-Gulf War Middle East" W. Judd Peak "One World Divisible" David Reynolds Brian Trumbore

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