As we pick up our story, 140,000 coal miners (represented by the United Mine Workers) have walked off their jobs in May 1902. The UMW's president, John Mitchell, manages to keep the strikers under control, but the mine owners (who are essentially the same as the railroad owners whose lines fed into the mines) were not going to give in to the workers demands for more money and a lighter work week.

George Baer was president of the Reading Railroad and spokesperson for the mine owners. In a private letter that was later revealed to the press, Baer declared that, "The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given control of the property interests of the country."

After Baer's letter, Clarence Darrow pronounced him "George the Last" and the Chicago Tribune said that the "real subverters of law and order" were not the strikers but the coal road presidents. [Jean Strouse].

For his part, President Theodore Roosevelt was infuriated. In a meeting at the White House with Baer, he said it was he, the president, who had the power, and if need be he would exercise it by calling out the troops to take over the mines and run them. It was the first time a U.S. president had threatened such an action.

"It would be a good thing to have national control, or at least supervision, over these big coal corporations, I am sure," Roosevelt said. "But that would simply have to come as an incident of the general movement to exercise control of such corporations." [Remember, Roosevelt was gearing up for various antitrust suits outside of this one labor issue.]

Meanwhile, J.P. Morgan returned from Europe in August and the principals all tried to get him to arbitrate between the owners and the strikers. Morgan was a trusted party to the dispute.

But Morgan said he wanted the two sides to work things out themselves, and if they couldn't, then it was the role of government to step in, not he. However, despite these public pronouncements, he was working behind the scenes to resolve the problem.

Between May and October, the price of coal rose from $5 to $30 a ton. Morgan did what he could to help, as in setting up depots for the poor in Manhattan where they could buy coal below cost.

Nationally, however, President Roosevelt had broader worries on his mind. The 1902 congressional elections were fast approaching, as was winter. He had decided to seize the coalmines. Rumors had been flying that other trade unions would join the strikers in sympathy. The president was convinced that any further continuation of the labor troubles would "mean a crisis only less serious than the civil war."

And so it was that on October 3, Roosevelt hosted the mine owners, led by Baer, and the UMW's John Mitchell. While the UMW was always seeking recognition, Mitchell denied that this was a major issue in the current strike. Then, in Roosevelt's words, the operators showed "extraordinary stupidity and bad temper," berating Mitchell and accusing the president, himself, for suggesting that union leaders had equal standing in a labor dispute between workers and their employers. Baer's men would not "deal with a set of outlaws." [Henry Graff]

When word got out that the owners were holding the strikers feet to the fire, public support for the miners only increased and on October 8 they voted not to end the strike.

And was Roosevelt really preparing to send in the troops? Maybe he was just bluffing. History hasn't reached a final conclusion on the matter. What is known is that he sent Elihu Root, his Secretary of War, to secretly meet with Morgan in New York. Remember that Morgan's interests lay with his financial holdings in the railroad companies. Strikes were not in his best interest and Root found him fuming over the way Baer had "botched things." Root and Morgan drafted an agreement designed to force the owners to accept arbitration. Morgan delivered it personally to Roosevelt on October 13.

But there was one more stumbling block. The coal road operators agreed to arbitration by an independent commission, but not to negotiate with the union. Mitchell, a model of decorum during the strike, insisted on two representatives out of the five panel members. The initial commission was packed with the owners' lackeys. Finally, Roosevelt snuck in a guy to labors' liking and by October 23, the miners were back to work.

5 months later the strike was formally settled; a major triumph for the principle of arbitration in America. The commission awarded the miners a 10% raise (they had received a prior 10% increase in 1900…but that was after a 20-year drought) and the workday was reduced to 9 hours from 10.

The UMW still did not have the official recognition it sought, but the miners did have representation on a new grievance board. Some of the chains of serfdom were finally coming off. [But the UMW was blasted later, however, for its treatment of the 7,000 workers who had not joined the strike.]

For President Roosevelt, the strike represented a landmark in presidential initiative and leadership, and the president was also extremely appreciative of Morgan's efforts in the whole matter. And Morgan was happy he didn't have to deal with a national fuel shortage.

But this relatively new feeling of good will wouldn't last forever. In our final part of the UMW story, we will explore some far more violent actions taken against the miners, as well as a battle fought within the UMW's leadership that proved rather bloody.

Sources: Same as Part1.

Brian Trumbore